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UNFAm TRADE PRACTICEs-RoBINSON-PATMAN Aar-ExcLUSION OF SELLER's BROKER FROM COVERAGE UNDER SECTION 2(c)-Petitioners, a brokerage
partnership acting as a seller's agent, sold a commodity to a buyer at five
cents below the seller's normal price. The seller agreed to this reduction
only because the petitioners agreed to reduce their commission on the sale
from 5% to 3%. Thus 2.75 cents of the reduction was absorbed by the
brokers and 2.25 cents was absorbed by the seller. Respondent Federal
Trade Commission ordered petitioners to cease and desist from selling at
such a reduction on the ground that the reduction in the regular rate of
commission constituted an indirect payment by the brokers of part of their
commission to the buyer, and as such was unlawful under section 2(c) of
the Clayton Act as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act.1 On review, held,
order set aside. Neither the language of section 2(c) nor its legislative history
indicates that a seller's broker is covered by that section. Henry Broch and
Company v. Federal Trade Commission, (7th Cir. 1958) 261 F. (2d) 725.
Section 2(c) of the Robinson-Patman Act prohibits the payment or
receipt, in connection with the sale or purchase of goods, of anything of
value to the other party or to an agent of the other party (or such agent's
statutory equivalent) except for services rendered in connection with the
purchase or sale.2 Although section 2(c) has not been interpreted by the

1 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §13, amending §2 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat.
730 (1914), 15 u.s.c. (1952) §§12-27.
2 Section 2(c) reads: " ... it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce,
in the course of such commerce, to pay or grant, or •to receive or accept, anything of
value as a commission, brokerage, or other compensation, or any allowance or discount
in lieu thereof, except for services rendered in connection with the sale or purchase of
goods, wares, or merchandise, either to the other party to such transaction or to an agent,
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Supreme Court, it has received wide and definitive discussion in the various
courts of appeals. A buyer's agent3 cannot receive brokerage commissions
from the seller whether such agent keeps the commissions4 or passes them
on to the buyer,5 and whether or not such agent renders services to the
seller. 6 Likewise, a buyer cannot receive a brokerage payment7 or discount
in lieu thereof8 from the seller. The fact that the discount reflects a saving
in costs resulting from differing methods in which such commodities are
sold is no defense since section 2(a), which allows such defense,9 is independent of section 2(c). 1 Furthermore, neither a buyer nor a buyer's agent
can avail himself of the "services rendered" exception of 2(c). 11 The principal case fits into the pattern of previous decisions dealing with the brokerage provision in that none of them proscribed the actions of the "true
independent seller's broker." Nevertheless, the breadth of the court's pronouncement that sellers' brokers are not intended to be covered by the
provision seems unwarranted. In so holding, the court relies on statements
made in congressional hearings and debates, 12 but overlooks the best evi-

°

representative, or other intermediary therein where such intermediary is acting in fact
for or in behalf, or is subject to the direct or indirect control, of any party to such
transaction other than the person by whom such compensation is so granted or paid."
For an extensive annotation and discussion of the cases under this section, see 149 A.L.R.
650 (1944) as well as the treatises and articles cited in note II infra.
3 E.g., one "acting in fact for or in •behalf, or . . . subject to the direct or indirect
control (of the buyer) ••. .''
4 Webb-Crawford Co. v. FTC, (5th Cir. 1940) 109 F. (2d) 268, cert. den. 310 U.S. 638
(1940); Fitch v. Kentucky-Tennessee Light &: Power Co., (6th Cir. 1943) 136 F. (2d) 12.
5 Oliver Brothers v. FTC, (4th Cir. 1939) 102 F. (2d) 763; Quality Bakers of America
v. FTC, (1st Cir. 1940) 114 F. (2d) 393.
6 Biddle Purchasing Co. v. FTC, (2d Cir. 1938) 96 F. (2d) 687, cert. den. 305 U.S. 634
(1938); Oliver Brothers v. FTC, note 5 supra.
7 Southgate Brokerage Co. v. FTC, (4th Cir. 1945) 150 F. (2d) 607, cert. den. 326 U.S.
774 (1945).
s Great Atlantic &: Pacific Tea Co. v. FTC, (3d Cir. 1939) 106 F. (2d) 667, cert. den.
308 U.S. 625 (1940), reh. den. 309 U.S. 694 (1940).
9 Section 2(a) provides: "That nothing herein contained shall prevent differentials
which make only due allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery
resulting from differing methods or quantities in which such commodities are to such
purchaser sold or delivered. . • ."
10 See, e.g., Great Atlantic &: Pacific Tea Co. v. FTC, note 8 supra.
11 See, e.g., Southgate Brokerage Co. v. FTC, note 7 supra. To the effect that the
courts have read the "services rendered" exception out of the statute, see AUSTIN, PRICE
DISCRIMINATION AND RELATED PROBLEMS UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN Acr, rev. ed. (1953);
Austern, "Section 2(c)," in N.Y. STATE BAR AssN., ROBINSON-PATMAN Acr SYMPOSIUM 37
(1946); Chadwell, "An Analysis of Section 2(c)," CHICAGO BAR ASSOCIATION SYMPOSIUM ON
THE ROBINSON-PATMAN Acr (1947); Oppenheim, "Administration of the Brokerage Provision of the Robinson-Patman Act," 8 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 511 (1940); REPORT OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMllllTTEE To STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 188 (1955).
12 See principal case at 728, n. 4, which refers to 80 CoNG. REc. 3114, 6281-6282,
7759-7760 (1936), and H. Hearings on H.R. 8442, H.R. 4995, H.R. 5062, 74th Cong., 1st
sess., pp. 37, 218, 258 (1935).
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dence of legislative intent, the congressional committee reports.is While
the court's holding seems to assume a great deal of surplusage in the statutory declaration, it should be recognized that Congress probably had a
dual intent in enacting section 2(c): first, to condemn as illegal per se
discriminatory prices cloaked as brokerage allowances; 14 and, second, to
preserve the wholesome business of the "true independent broker."15 In
the principal case a conflict arises between these two purposes, for the court
allows the seller to reduce its price to the buyer by obtaining a reduction
in the allowance due its broker. Thus a volume purchaser was able to obtain a preferential discount and part of that discount was undeniably in
lieu of brokerage.16 In Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Federal Trade
Commission,11 the court held that a seller's saving in cost resulting from
the non-use of brokers could not be passed on to a buyer.18 The instant
holding would seem to sanction the granting of preferential discounts to
volume buyers through the medium of the protected independent broker.
It is difficult to see why a seller should be allowed to pass on to the buyer
a saving in cost attributable to a partial reduction in brokerage when the
same seller could not sell direct to the buyer at a cost reflecting a total
savings in brokerage. This of course assumes the major problem presented
by this case: whether the protection afforded the independent broker extends to the other parties to the transaction. It would seem that the same
arguments relied upon in the principal case to exempt the broker from
section 2(c) coverage could be extended to the case of the buyer and seller
in any transaction utilizing an independent seller's broker.19 In this event,
the commission would be compelled to resort to a proceeding against the
seller under section 2(a) or the buyer under section 2(£). This would not
give the commission the advantage of the per se violation approach under

13

H. Rep. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d sess. (1936); S. Rep. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d sess. (1936);

H. Rep. 2951 (Report of Conference Committee), 74th Cong., 2d sess. (1936). These reports

indicate that although the moving purpose of Congress was the prohibition of price
concessions coerced by large ·buyers, particularly chain stores, the section was intended
to prohibit an "allowance .by •the buyer direct to the seller, or by the seller direct to the
buyer; and . . . by either to an agent or intermediary . . . of the other." Conference
Report at p. 7.
14 See note 13 supra.
15 See H. Rep. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d sess., p. 15 (1936): "The relation of broker to his
client is a fiduciary one. . . . [T]o protect •those who deal in the streams of commerce
against breaches of faith in its relation of trust, is to foster confidence in its processes and
promote its wholesomeness and volume."
16 A competitor of petitioners in the principal case had refused to cut his brokerage
on the belief that such practice would violate the Robinson-Patman Act. See principal
case at 727.
17 Note 8 supra.
18 See also Southgate Brokerage Co. v. FTC, note 7 supra.
19 See legislative history cited by the court in the principal case at 728, n. 4. Likewise,
no case has been found wherein any of the three parties to a transaction involving an
independent seller's broker has been prosecuted under §2(c).
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section 2(c), but would require it to sustain the burden of proving either
price discrimination and injury to competition under section 2(a), or the
knowing inducement or receipt of an illegal price discrimination under
section 2(£).20 In viewing the brokerage provision as but one strand in the
fabric of national antitrust law and policy,21 it would appear that the best
answer to the problems posed by this case would be to hold that sellers have
an inherent right to pass true cost savings on to buyers and eventually to
the consumer.22
James A. Park, S.Ed.

20 Regarding the relative uncertainty of this approach, see Automatic Canteen Co.
of America v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61 (1953).
21 See REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE To STUDY THE
ANTITRUST LAWS 1-2 (1955).
22 See Simplicity Pattern Co. v. FTC, (D.C. Cir. 1958) 258 F. (2d) 673, cert. granted
358 U.S. 897 (1958).

